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Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, transnational activities of security agencies have 
been expanded considerably. In parallel, with the establishment and extension of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, the European Union has become an important player in this 
field – even more so since the full integration of the policies related to policing, security and 
justice into the EU framework with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The paper analyses, from a trans-disciplinary legal and political science perspective, the role 
that European courts play in the regulation of such kinds of transnational security activities. 
With the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by national constitutions, the European multi-level system 
currently has a normative framework that is dense compared to the situation in other parts of 
the world. Citizens can, under certain conditions, bring cases before national courts, the 
Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU. 
The paper’s central research question is related to the role that the CJEU plays in the 
protection of human rights and civil liberties in the emerging EU multi-level security setting, 
and the structural limits of court interventions in this field. The paper shows that the 
institutional setting is favourable for a high level of fundamental rights protection. However, 
the still emerging normative framework leads to highly diverse outcomes regarding the case 
law brought before the CJEU. This outcome is the result of conflicting interests such as 
security, individual freedom and the effective application of the relevant secondary EU law. 
Keywords: Court of Justice of the EU; European Court of Human Rights; Area of Freedom, 





Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, transnational activities of security agencies (police 
agencies, secret services) have been massively expanded, e.g. with worldwide data collection 
by secret services such as the US National Security Agency (NSA) or the institutionalisation 
of watchlists for people suspected to be related to terrorist activities. Many of these security 
measures are accompanied by considerable intrusions on individual human rights: primarily 
privacy and data protection, but also the freedom of movement and sometimes even the right 
to life and physical welfare. 
In parallel, with the establishment and extension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ), the European Union has become an important player in this field. The importance of 
the EU as an actor has deepened since the full integration of the policies related to policing, 
security and justice into the EU framework with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The paper analyses, from a trans-disciplinary legal and political science perspective, the role 
that European courts, especially the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), play in the regulation 
of such kinds of transnational security activities. With the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
national constitutions, the European multi-level system currently has a normative framework 
that is dense compared to the situation in other parts of the world. Citizens can, under certain 
conditions, bring cases before national courts, the Council of Europe’s European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the CJEU with its two components – the Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the General Court (formerly Court of First Instance). 
The paper’s central research question is related to the role that these courts play in the 
protection of human rights and civil liberties in the EU multi-level security setting, and the 
structural limits of court interventions in this political and administrative field. The paper also 
discusses the relationship between the limitations of the role that courts can play for the 
regulation of transnational security activities and the regulatory shortcomings in substantive 
European and international law. The paper shows that the institutional setting is favourable 
for a high level of fundamental rights protection. However, the still emerging normative 
framework leads to highly diverse outcomes regarding the case law brought before the CJEU. 
This divergent outcome is the result of conflicting interests such as security versus individual 
freedom in addition to an effective application of EU secondary law, which is reflected in the 
Court’s case law – together with the Court’s own institutional interest, especially concerning 
its relationship with the ECtHR and the Member States’ constitutional courts. 
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The trans-disciplinary approach followed in this paper is situated in the broader political and 
scholarly debate on the emergence of a European multi-level security system (e.g. Fijnaut 
2010 and 2015; Occhipinti 2003; Bigo 1996; Bigo, Carrera et al. 2011; Aden 1998, 2014a and 
2014b) and on the role of courts in the European multi-level system (e.g. Weiler 1981; Stone 
Sweet 2000; Alter 2000, 2001 and 2009; Höpner 2010a and 2010b; Panke 2010; Kelemen 
2011; Zapka 2014). The paper intends to connect these two bodies of literature empirically 
based on a selection of the CJEU’s recent case law (see also Aden 2013a on the role of AFSJ 
issues in the German Constitutional Court’s judgment on the constitutionality of the Lisbon 
Treaty). In the past, the scholarly debates on European courts and on the AFSJ have been only 
rarely connected (e.g.by Hatzopoulos 2008; Peers 2013, Aden 2013a), as the EU courts’ 
jurisdiction for most aspects of the AFSJ was a “quantité néglgeable” until the early 2000s, 
compared to other European policy areas.  
 
2. The evolving European multi-level security setting and fundamental rights before and 
after 2001 and 2009 
In a trans-disciplinary, historical-institutionalist perspective, the 2001 terrorist attacks and the 
changes of the legal framework for the AFSJ with the Treaty of Lisbon can be perceived as 
critical junctures that modify previous path-dependencies and that explain change that has 
occurred for the role of courts in this field (cf. Schmidt 2010 on the application of the 
historical-institutionalist concept of path-dependencies on the EU courts’ case law). 
The relevance of legal protection against transnational activities of security agencies is 
directly connected to the intensity of the security measures. Recent escalation of activity is 
often framed as a reaction to the 2001 terrorist attacks. However, a long-term perspective 
shows that the developments that emerged since 2001 also build upon path-dependencies 
established over several decades. Since the 1970s, trans-border security cooperation has 
become an important issue in Western Europe, and transnational police cooperation dating 
even back to the late 19
th
 century (cf. Fijnaut 2010 and 2015; Deflem 2002). With a growing 
intensity of cooperation, cases in which individual liberties and rights are affected are more 
likely to occur. 
From the very beginning, transnational cooperation among security agencies was related to 
information sharing about people suspected to be involved in criminal activities or believed to 
be a danger for public security. However, only since the 1970s when police agencies started to 
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use computer technology for their databases, was police information sharing conceived as a 
human rights issue. This new perception was strongly underlined in the 1980s when the 
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) established the fundamental right to 
informational self-determination (BVerfGE 65, 1; cf. Schlögel 2010, 47-52; Aden 1998 and 
2014a). The status as a fundamental right means that collecting and transferring data restricts 
informational self-determination and therefore requires justification by a law. Proportionality 
of the security measure is then required in relation to the intensity of the intrusion into 
privacy. Soon this perspective became influential at the European level where police 
cooperation was more and more officialised and legitimised by international law treaties and 
later by EU law. While transnational information sharing among security agencies was mostly 
informal at the beginning, there has been at least some kind of pro forma regulation in the 
relevant pieces of EU law for Schengen, Europol, Eurodac, the Visa Information System etc. 
(cf. Boehm 2012; Aden 1998 and 2014a and 2014c; Albrecht 2015), while the instruments for 
information sharing among secret services remain mostly unregulated and secret. 
Individuals’ fundamental rights are also broadly concerned where security agencies have 
gained access to data initially gathered for other purposes. In the EU multi-level system this is 
the case for fingerprints (Eurodac) and for the Visa Information System (VIS). Both databases 
established for visa and immigration policy can be used by security agencies under conditions 
defined in the relevant secondary EU law (cf. Balzacq & Léonard 2013; Aden 2014c). 
In the period after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, intensified cooperation led to new 
measures restricting individual rights. People suspected to be related to the financing of 
terrorist activities were placed on terrorist lists established by the UN Security Council and 
by the European Union. Being listed has severe consequences including restrictions on 
travelling and participation in economic life (cf. Eckes 2009; Sullivan & Hayes 2010; Aden 
2013b). Preventive data retention became a major issue in that period – sometimes based on 
legal instruments (cf. Boehm 2012; Boehm & Cole 2014; European Commission 2012), 
sometimes on more or less informal practices established by transnational networks of secret 
services under the lead of the US NSA (cf. the Beckedahl & Meister (eds.) 2013). 
The instruments available for EU-wide law enforcement increased with the European Arrest 
Warrant. This law enforcement tool facilitates the easy arrest of individuals anywhere in the 
EU for crimes that they are suspected to have committed in other Member States. Therefore 
cases in which the individuals concerned feel a need to have such kinds of measures checked 
by a court have become much more relevant (cf. Peers 2013; Aden 2013a). 
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When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, full integration of AFSJ policies into 
the EU framework became another critical juncture for the courts’ role in the multi-level field. 
With the full integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU primary law, the 
normative framework has developed considerably towards – at least potentially – a higher 
weight of fundamental rights in CJEU case law. And with the European Parliament’s 
increased powers for AFSJ, the elaboration of the relevant substantive law is subject to 
broader political debates than before, whereas previously justice and home affairs ministers 
decided alone in most cases (cf. Aden 2015). However, this does not mean that the new 
secondary legislation to be applied by the CJEU is necessarily more oriented towards the 
protection of civil liberties (cf. Albrecht 2015 and Kietz 2015). 
 
3. Remedies before courts in the emerging EU multi-level security system: two types of 
access to courts and potential inter-court competition 
In democratic rule of law systems, providing legal remedies against activities of security 
agencies that restrict individual rights is among the core tasks of courts. In the EU, this is a 
recent phenomenon, as internal security cooperation only became an official EU policy with 
the Treaty of Maastricht, and even then remained an intergovernmental third pillar until 2009 
when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. With successive steps bringing the former third 
pillar policies closer to a core EU competency, the number of cases related to security issues 
brought before EU courts was already important in the period before 2009. 
As there are still no “operative” police units at the EU level, the Member States’ security 
agencies play an important role in the implementation of security measures in the EU multi-
level system. Therefore, individuals concerned can also use legal remedies before national 
courts. Thus, the intensity of legal protection depends upon the domestic legal system and the 
relevant procedural law. European harmonisation is low in this field, and the intensity of legal 
protection therefore depends upon the access to legal remedies that national law allows to 
individuals.  
All EU Member States are also members of the Council of Europe and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Therefore, cases in which the Member States‘ 
security agencies implement security measures based on EU law might also be brought before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) if individuals feel that their Conventional 
rights have been violated. Apparently, this has not been relevant in practical terms yet, but 
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this might change in the future when the EU becomes a member of the ECHR. However, the 
CJEU’s opinion (no. 2/13) published on 18 December 2014 on the draft accession treaty 
demonstrates that the accession also creates a potential concurrence and inter-court 
competition between the CJEU and the ECtHR – the outcome of which remains uncertain. 
In the perspective of the citizens’ remedies against security agencies’ activities that endanger 
their fundamental rights, two types of courts can be distinguished: courts with direct and with 
indirect citizens’ access. The ECtHR and some national constitutional courts, e.g. the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, under certain formal requirements, grant direct access to citizens. 
Normally, all remedies before ordinary national courts have to be exhausted before citizens 
can bring an application before the ECtHR or a constitutional complaint before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. By contrast, for the CJEU, direct access is limited to cases in 
which citizens are directly concerned by an EU decision, for example, as recipient of a 
subsidy or as employee of an EU institution. This has led to numerous strategies developed by 
(potential) litigants to use other pathways for access to the CJEU, especially preliminary 
reference proceedings that require a case before a national court in which the citizens 
convince judges to refer to the CJEU questions related to EU law aspects of the case (cf. Alter 
2001 on strategies developed by citizens and NGOs). 
 
4. The Court of Justice of the European Union: highly contested judgments and the 
Courts’ extended role for AFSJ issues since the Treaty of Lisbon 
The trans-disciplinary debate on the role that the Court of Justice of the EU plays in the 
European multi-level system was initially built around the question how to explain the Court’s 
political influence. The “classical” judgments that established politically highly relevant 
landmark elements of doctrine such as the supremacy of EU law over the Member States’ law 
in the 1960s and the direct effect of European directives that have not been correctly 
implemented by the Member States in the 1970s and 1980s have been in the centre of the 
relevant scholarly debates (e.g. Weiler 1981 and 1999; Cappelletti, Seccombe & Weiler, 
1986; Stone Sweet 2000; Craig 2001; Alter 2001). 
In recent years, there has been a shift towards a controversial debate on the impact of 
judgments by the Court of Justice on individual liberties. The contributions to this debate are 
characterised by divergent perspectives which depend upon the chosen policy fields or 
normative judgments found in the scholarly literature.  
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Those scholars interested in labour policy intensively debated a number of judgments that 
tended to attribute a higher legal value to the economic fundamental freedoms compared to 
the workers’ and trade unions’ collective fundamental rights (cf. Joerges & Rödl 2009, 10 ff.; 
Höpner, 2010b, 15 ff.; Sack 2010). In 2007, in the Viking Line case, the Court had to answer 
the question whether activities organised by trade unions to force a company to conclude a 
labour agreement were in line with freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU). The Court 
held that the protection of workers’ rights can be of general public interest, but claimed a case 
by case check of the proportionality of the trade unions’ activities in relation to the 
employer’s freedom of establishment (ECJ, case C-438/05, judgment of 18.12.2007, 
International Transport Workers‘ Federation/ Finish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP et 
al.). As the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became binding only with the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Court did not take into account the right of collective bargaining and action 
guaranteed in Article 28 of the Charter. The Court’s judgment in the 2007 Laval case has been 
contested in a similar way. In this case, the Court had to decide on a conflict between trade 
unions blocking construction sites in order to prevent employers from paying low wages. The 
employers argued that this was an illegal infringement to the free movement of services. 
Again the Court did not take Article 28 of the Charter into account nor the “common 
tradition” of the Member States’ fundamental rights. Another highly contested case related to 
labour law and trade unions concerned public procurement law. The Court held that rules 
declaring domestic wages based on trade agreements binding for companies from other 
Member States for public procurement (“Tariftreueklausel”) are incompatible with the free 
movement of services (ECJ, case C-346/06, judgment of 3.4.2008 (Rüffert); cf. Sack 2010, 
631-632 for a critique.) 
For the policies that belonged to the third pillar from the Treaty of Maastricht until the Treaty 
of Lisbon entered into force, the Court’s case law gained importance with the successive steps 
that brought AFSJ issues closer to the general EU framework – several years before the end of 
the third pillar. Preliminary reference proceedings gained importance for this policy field 
when Member States made use of the option opened by ex-Article 35 TEU (in the Amsterdam 
Treaty version) to recognise the Court’s jurisdiction for third pillar cases (cf. Tohidipur 2008, 
121 f.).  
4.1 Judgments on the legal value of third pillar instruments 
The Court used ex-Article 35 cases to extend the legal value of laws passed under the third 
pillar regime. In the broadly discussed 2005 Pupino case, the Court stated clearly that third 
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pillar framework decisions, the equivalent to directives in the former third pillar, were part of 
its jurisdiction (ECJ, case C-105/03, judgment of 16.6.2005, Criminal proceedings against 
Maria Pupino; cf. Callewaert 2007). 
In 2005, the Belgian lawyers‘ NGO Advocaaten voor de Wereld challenged the validity of the 
EU third pillar framework-decision on the European arrest warrant (2002/584/JHA) and 
convinced a Belgian court to send questions on this purpose to the ECJ. In its judgment, the 
Court rejected the argument brought forward by the litigants that the framework decision was 
in conflict with the principles of equality and non-discrimination (ECJ, case C-303/2005, 
judgment of 3.5.2007, Advocaaten voor de Wereld v. Leden van de Ministerraad; cf. 
Hatzopoulos 2008). Interestingly, the Court intensively referred to the old version of Article 6 
TEU and to the relevant case law by the ECtHR – and even mentioned the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (paragraph 46) - a rarity at that time.  
Both judgments continued the Court’s “classical” line of pro-European case-law. They 
contributed to reduce uncertainties related to the legal value of the former third pillar 
instruments that had persisted until then – by attributing them a legal value very similar to the 
core EC law at that time. With the Treaty of Lisbon and the integration of the third pillar into 
the new EU framework, this case law has become legal history. However, in a trans-
disciplinary perspective, these cases still demonstrate the persistence of the “classical” line of 
pro-European ECJ/CJEU decisions. 
4.2 Individuals concerned by substantive European law: ne bis in idem 
For other types of cases, the Court started to intervene when relevant parts of AFSJ issues had 
been transferred to the first pillar by the Treaty of Amsterdam, especially Schengen 
cooperation. In a number of cases, the Court had to decide how to handle the ne bis in idem 
principle laid down Article 50 Schengen Convention and also in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an 
offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union 
in accordance with the law” (Article 50). Cases in which citizens had been convicted for 
criminal offenses in one Member State and were then accused for the same kind of offense 
related to the first case in another Member State were brought before the Court, e.g. cases of 
trans-border drug trafficking or violations of customs law (e.g. ECJ, case C-436/04, Van 
Esbroeck, judgment of 9.3.2006; case C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, judgment of 18.7.2007; case 
C-467/04 Gasparini et al., judgment of 28.9.2006). In the Van Esbroeck case, the Court 
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required the “existence of a set of facts which are inextricably linked together” for the 
application of ne bis in idem – and the Court found that this is the case for the importation and 
exportation of the same illegal drugs. However, the outcome of these cases was not 
necessarily directed towards a high level of protection of ne bis in idem as a fundamental 
right. In the Kraaijenbrink case, the Court found that the same criminal intention is not 
sufficient as a link between different criminal acts – and that therefore the national criminal 
courts may punish these acts separately (cf. Weyembergh 2013 for an in-depth analysis of the 
relevant cases). 
Even if the normative value of ne bis in idem has been further strengthened with the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, complex cases in which new questions are raised continue to be 
brought before the Court. In the Akerberg Fransson case, the Court found that the 
combination of a sanction foreseen by tax law and by criminal law is not in conflict with the 
ne bis idem principle (CJEU, case C-617/10, Aklagare v. Hans Akerberg Fransson, judgment 
of 26.2.2013). For cases of punishments that combine imprisonments and a fine, the Court 
held that ne bis in idem is not yet violated if the same case is being heard before a criminal 
court in another Member State (e.g. CJEU, case C-129/14, judgment of 27.5.2014).  
The ne bis in idem cases show that the Court is far away from judicial activism in favor of a 
broad interpretation of fundamental rights. 
4.3 Autonomous interpretation of fundamental rights by the EU courts: the terrorist 
watchlist cases 
Annulment cases occurred where individual rights were directly affected by decisions under 
EU law. Repeatedly citizens brought cases before the Court related to the terrorist watchlists. 
The cases show the importance of the institutional setting for access to justice. Because the 
EU doubles the listing according to Regulation (EC) no. 881/2002, the individuals concerned 
have the right to challenge this decision in an annulment procedure according to Article 263 
TFEU (ex-Article 230 TEC). At the beginning, the former Court of First Instance (now: 
General Court) ruled that the EU simply had to accept decisions by the UN Security Council 
to put someone’s name on the UN terrorist list (Court of First Instance, case T-315/01 Kadi v. 
Council and Commission, judgment of 21.9.2005). Only when the Court of Justice heard the 
case in the second instance, were the litigants able to successfully argue that the listing had to 
be annulled because they did not respect minimum procedural standards for decisions 
restricting human rights (ECJ, case C-402 and 415/05 P, judgment of 3.9.2008, Kadi and Al 
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Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the EU; cf. Eckes 2010; Aden 2013b). In 
these cases, the Court did not yet quote the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU Charter.  
This changed in the next round of judgments in these cases. After the 2008 judgment, the UN 
and the EU somewhat improved the procedural standards for the listing process, especially 
with an ombudsperson established to hear cases in which the individuals or groups concerned 
demand a de-listing (cf. Aden 2013b). According to the revised procedure, Mr. Kadi was 
listed again, and he initiated a new case before the General Court that he won (Case T-85/09 
Kadi v. European Commission, judgment of 17 June 2010). This time, the first instance 
judgment was challenged in an appeal before the Court of Justice by the Commission and a 
number of Member States. The Court of Justice rejected the appeal and referred to the right to 
good administration (Article 41 (2)) and to the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
(Article 47) guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that now had become 
binding (CJEU, cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10, judgment of 18 July 2013). 
These cases show a trend in the Court’s AFSJ case law: While the Court apparently does not 
tend to a wide material interpretation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, the 
series of watchlist cases has considerably strengthened procedural requirements and legal 
remedies for EU law based State intrusions into fundamental rights. This is in line with a 
trend in national constitutional law, e.g. with the “protection of fundamental rights by 
procedures” (“Grundrechtsschutz durch Verfahren”) claimed by the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
4.4 The CJEU as a constitutional court applying the proportionality doctrine? The 
invalid data retention directive 
Similarly, the Court’s position developed for data retention. In 2006, the Irish government had 
challenged the EC Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. However, the legal question to be 
answered was related to the EC competence to regulate data retention, not to the restrictions 
to fundamental rights that data retention constitutes. Ireland’s annulment case was not 
successful. The Court followed the Commission’s legal position saying that the EC was 
entitled to regulate data retention under the first pillar because of the implications for the 
internal market in relation to telecommunication services (ECJ, case C-301/06, judgment of 
10.2.2009; Ireland v. European Parliament and Council; cf. Kahler 2008).  
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In 2012, data retention was challenged again in preliminary reference cases initiated in Ireland 
and in Austria. This time, the Court declared Directive 2006/24/EC invalid, arguing that the 
obligation of data retention as required by the Directive is not proportional in view of the 
interference with the right to the protection of private life (Article 7) and data protection 
(Article 8) guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CJEU, cases C-293/12 and C-
594/12, judgment of 8.4.2014; cf. Boehm & Cole 2014). Interestingly, this judgment is 
mainly relying on proportionality arguments – with the Court holding that data retention is not 
incompatible with fundamental rights under all circumstances. These arguments are very 
close to the German Constitutional Court’s 2010 judgment on the German transposition of the 
data retention directive (BVerfGE 125, 260), even if the Constitutional Court did not dare to 
question the constitutionality of the European Directive at that time (cf. Aden 2013a).  
If constitutional courts construct their judgments around proportionality arguments, they leave 
a margin to politics to use far-reaching restrictions on fundamental rights if the security aim is 
very important, e.g. the prevention of terrorist attacks. The German Constitutional Court has 
been using this strategy in a whole series of security-related judgments (cf. Schlögel 2010 and 
Aden 2013a for a critical analysis). 
4.5 Fundamental rights limited by effective EU law? 
Some of the cases discussed above, especially the 2014 data retention case, demonstrate that 
the new status of the Charter has the potential to bring the Court’s role closer to a classical 
(constitutional) court protecting the citizens against excessive security measures. However, 
this role is less clear when the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter are in conflict 
with other elements of EU law doctrine, e.g. effet utile. This occurred for example in the 
Akerberg Fransson case with its restrictive interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle 
(CJEU, case C-617/10, judgment of 26 February 2013; see section 4.2 above).  
Other cases show that the Charter does not necessarily motivate the Court to make judgments 
in which it opts for an activist and broadening interpretation of fundamental rights. In a 
preliminary reference case from a German administrative court, challenging the obligation to 
include biometrical data in passports, established by Regulation (EC) No. 2252/2004, the 
Court did not find this obligation disproportionate in relation to the aim to prevent the 
fraudulent use of passports (CJEU, case C-291/12, judgment of 17 October 2013).  
Article 53 of the Charter guarantees a high level of protection for the interpretation of the 
rights included in the Charter and in other legal documents, i.e. in national constitutions: 
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“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union 
law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' 
constitutions”. In a preliminary reference case concerning the European arrest warrant, 
brought before the CJEU by the Spanish Constitutional Court, the CJEU opted for a more 
restrictive interpretation of Article 53: “The interpretation envisaged by the national court at 
the outset is that Article 53 of the Charter gives general authorisation to a Member State to 
apply the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by its constitution when that 
standard is higher than that deriving from the Charter and, where necessary, to give it priority 
over the application of provisions of EU law. Such an interpretation would, in particular, 
allow a Member State to make the execution of a European arrest warrant issued for the 
purposes of executing a sentence rendered in absentia subject to conditions intended to avoid 
an interpretation which restricts or adversely affects fundamental rights recognised by its 
constitution, even though the application of such conditions is not allowed under Article 4a(1) 
of Framework Decision 2002/584. Such an interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter cannot 
be accepted” (CJEU, case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, judgment of 
26.2.2013, paragraphs 56-57).  
These cases demonstrate that, despite the data retention judgment, the CJEU is currently far 
from becoming a leading activist for the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
5. Old and new interconnections between the Court of Justice of the EU and the 
European Court of Human Rights in the European multi-level security system 
Until now, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has not been directly linked to EU 
law cases. However, the ECtHR influence on policing in the European multi-level system is 
considerable. For example, in the early 1990s, the Court contributed to establishing the 
principle that legal rules allowing the Member States to restrict fundamental rights must 
describe precisely what security agencies shall be allowed to do (ECtHR, application 
11801/85, Kruslin and Huvig v. France, judgment of 24 April 1990; cf. Aden 1998, 381). In 
numerous cases, the Court has defined limits for security agencies, for example, in relation to 
the prohibition of torture (Article 3), the right to liberty (Article 5) or the right to protection of 
private life (Article 8) as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.  
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The role of the Convention and of the ECtHR will probably become even more important in 
the emerging European multi-level security system when the option of the EU’s accession to 
the Convention foreseen in Article 6 (2) TEU and currently under negotiation becomes 
reality. In cases related to fundamental rights, judgments by the CJEU will then no longer be 
the last word, as individuals may bring the same case before the ECtHR. This might explain 
the restrictive outcome of the CJEU’s opinion no. 2/13 on the draft accession treaty published 
in December 2014. 
 
6. Conclusion and outlook: National und European courts in the evolving European 
multi-level security setting – the uncertain way towards accountability and rule of law 
In conclusion, the emerging European multi-level security system has developed a number of 
instruments that endanger the citizens’ fundamental rights. Binding the security agencies’ 
trans-border activities to legal rules and to a high level of protection for the individual rights 
concerned has therefore become ever more important. 
The parallel existence of legal remedies at different levels in the European multi-level system 
– national courts, the CJEU and the ECtHR – may be interpreted as an indicator for a 
development towards a high level of protection for the individuals’ fundamental rights. 
However, the paper has shown that a positioning towards a high level of protection for the 
citizens’ fundamental rights cannot be clearly detected for the CJEU. The Court now 
frequently uses references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, since the Charter has 
become legally binding with the Treaty of Lisbon, and also frequently quotes the ECtHR’s 
case law in its judgments. However, it is still not clear how the Court will position 
fundamental rights in relation to other elements of EU law: the economic fundamental 
freedoms, the effet utile doctrine and in relation to security interests brought forward in the 
relevant cases. For future rounds of Treaty revisions, this leads to the question whether the 
hierarchy of norms should be revised in order to attribute a higher legal value to fundamental 
rights in relation to economic fundamental freedoms.  
The further development of the CJEU’s role in the EU system will not only be determined 
autonomously in the legal system (in the sense of Luhmann 1995), but also depends upon 
political decision-making. Even more than in the past, this decision-making is restricted by 
the unanimity required for Treaty amendments (cf. Alter 2000 and 2001 on the consequences 
for political reactions to the ECJ’s case law).  
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This paper has shown that the interconnections between CJEU case law and politics are not 
limited to the annulment cases in which Member State governments are the litigants (cf. 
Adam, Bauer & Hartlapp 2015 on these cases) – or to the infringement proceedings directed 
against Member States (cf. Panke 2010). Cases from the citizens’ everyday life brought before 
the CJEU in preliminary reference proceedings largely depend upon the wording of secondary 
EU law as it has been passed by politics: for the AFSJ mainly by the Member States 
governments before the Treaty of Lisbon and now involving the Parliament and the Council. 
Another interesting question is related to the future relationship between national 
(constitutional) courts, the CJEU and the ECtHR. Will conflicts and concurrence between 
these courts become more relevant – or will there be coordination in favour of the protection 
of the individuals’ rights (cf. Jaeger 2005)? The further development of the European system 
of multi-level legal remedies will therefore remain an interesting topic for further trans-
disciplinary research. 
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